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Introduction. 
In this paper I will argue that in a wide range of circumstances religious activity and 
commercial activity may overlap, leading to what may fairly, albeit novelly, be categorised as 
commercial religion. This overlap is potentially problematic to law, raising as it does the 
possibility of inappropriate over-regulation of religious activity and religious claims and the 
possibility of inappropriate under-regulation of commercial activity and claims. One way to 
resolve this problem is to create a binary division between the commercial and the religious, 
so that any situation might be categorised as one or the other, and the appropriate legal 
framework and philosophies applied. This is the preferred route under the European 
Convention on Human Rights which, as I show in Part II, treats an activity as either 
commercial or religious. Such a separation does not, however, properly address the 
complexity of regulating commercial religion in practice. By exploring one case-study, the 
regulation of commercial religion in UK consumer law, in Part III I will show that the 
problems of commercial religion do not disappear even when an activity is categorised as 
commercial rather than religious. Part IV moves to consider strategies by which the European 
Court of Human Rights, UK courts and other legal actors such as Trading Standards Officers 
(TSOs), and those subject to regulation, may reblend the commercial and religious elements. 
The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the wider ramifications of this discussion. 
I. Commercial and religious: The problems.  
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Before doing so, however, it is important to set the parameters of this paper through some 
working definitions, and indicate through illustrative examples the importance of the 
problems raised. 
By religious, my general working definition is that religion consists of truth claims 
concerning metaphysical reality, and ancillary truth claims and practices flowing from such 
truth claims. So a belief in God, for instance, is a religious truth claim, from which may flow 
other religious beliefs, such as a duty of obedience to God, and religious organisations such 
as churches, and religious practices such as baptism. Increasingly, however, we are seeing an 
emphasis on a ‘certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’,1 or ‘a clear 
structure and belief system’.2 Rather than critique this increasingly dominant theme here, I 
will narrow my working definition of religion: a clear structure and belief system concerning 
metaphysical reality. This will undoubtedly exclude some activities which would be included 
in my broader definition – for instance palmists who did not share a clear structure and belief 
system beyond their belief in the efficacy of palmistry as a divination technique. It will, 
however, continue to include a broad range of activities, as my examples in the sections that 
follow will show. 
Commercial, too, may easily bear a variety of meanings. For instance, in relation to sales, one 
may categorise producing goods or services intending to exchange them for money them as 
commercial; or may restrict the term to sales intended to produce an operating profit, or to 
sales intended to produce a surplus which can be taken by the owners of the concern,
 3
 or to 
                                                          
1
 Campbell and Cosans v UK, (1982) 4 EHRR 293 para. 36. 
2
 Explanatory Notes to Equality Act 2006, para. 170. 
3
 See for instance W. Schimetta et al, “Wann ist eine klinische studie nicht-kommerziell”, 
(2004) Wiener miedizinische Wochenschrift 155, 233-6. 
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sales intended to go beyond meeting the basic human needs of the seller.
4
 At the core of the 
various definitions of commercial however, is the earning of money – for instance in a study 
of internet users commissioned by the Creative Commons, although many areas were unclear 
and contested, ‘creators and user generally consider uses that earn users money or involve 
online advertising to be commercial’.5 Accordingly, I will take as a working definition of 
commercial: carried out in part to generate an operating profit. This will include activities 
intended to generate an operating surplus to support loss-making activities, such as charging 
above break-even for wedding services in order to pay for heating of a place of worship 
during quieter services. 
Bringing these two working definitions together, a commercial religious activity is one which 
the person carrying it out sees as part of their clear structure and belief system concerning 
metaphysical reality, and which is also carried out in part to generate an operating profit. 
Commercial religion is capable of taking a wide range of forms. To anticipate examples used 
later, this can include, for instance, the provision of goods or services for profit as a religious 
duty (e.g. auditing by the  Church of Scientology), or the provision of goods or services 
which possess value only within a particular religious system (e.g. the saying of a Mass 
within Catholicism). It can also include the operation of a business in accord with a religious 
                                                          
4
 See for instance G.M. Branch et al, “Defining fishers in the South African context: 
Subsistence, artisanal and small-scale commercial sectors”, (2002) South African Journal of 
Marine Science 24, 475-487. 
5
 Creative Commons, “Defining ‘Noncommercial’: A study of how the online population 
understands ‘noncommercial use’”, September 2009 at 11 
(http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-
noncommercial/Defining_Noncommercial_fullreport.pdf, accessed 31 October 2011). 
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value system (e.g. the hotel run by the Bulls). Thus, commercial religion does not constitute a 
legal doctrine, but rather a factual nexus which may pose particular problems to a range of 
legal doctrines. 
Entanglement of the commercial and the religious in the way this definition emphasises has 
been identified as a marker for conflict between state and religious organisation.
6
  One reason 
that this is so problematic is that it may appear to outsiders to ‘indicate an increased 
probability that an organization is actually being operated to enrich insiders’.7 An activity 
comprehensible in purely commercial terms may in some cases be feared to constitute not a 
genuine exercise of religion, but rather a fraud, or exercise of undue influence, upon those 
who genuinely believe carried out by one who does not. Seeking to address the problem of 
the insincere or exploitative religious claimant who gains a financial benefit by their action 
may impact on other religious claimants, for instance one whose genuine religious belief is 
explained by the state as insincere.  
The disquiet with commercial religion, however, goes much deeper than the insincere 
claimant to religious interests. There is a recurrent perception that ‘proper religions don’t 
                                                          
6
 C.L. Harper and B.F. Le Beau, “The social adaptation of marginal religious movements in 
America”, (1993) 54(2) Sociology of Religion 171 at 180. Entanglement with the commercial 
poses problems beyond religion – consider for instance commercial sex, discussed below, and 
commercial human reproduction – on which see for instance K. Drabiak et al, “Ethics, law 
and commercial surrogacy: A call for uniformity”, (2007) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
35(2), 300-309. 
7
 T.A. Brown, “Religious nonprofits and the commercial manner test”, (1990) 99 Yale Law 
Journal 1631 at 1632. 
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charge’.8 Certainly, religions with a very significant cultural footprint in the UK do not see a 
natural linkage between the commercial and the religious. From some mainline Christian 
perspectives, for instance, religious officers should devote themselves to poverty, rather than 
anticipate a wage for religious services.
9
 The provision of religious services in return for 
payment is not only dubious but, in some cases, the sin of simony.
10
 From a pluralist position, 
however, it is equally clear that other religious communities in the jurisdiction see things 
rather differently. The Church of Scientology
11
 has been criticised for its provision of 
religious services for a fee, with some critics referring to it as $cientology to ensure this 
criticism is made throughout their discussions.
12
  From the Church’s point of view, however, 
the requirement of payment is in part a decision as to the fairest way in which to pay for the 
activities of the Church,
13
 but also theologically driven by the doctrine of exchange.
14
 
                                                          
8
 Lucy Jones, quoted at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7354089.stm (accessed 29 April 
2009). See further J. Carrette and R. King, Selling spirituality: The silent takeover of religion, 
Routledge, 2004. 
9
 For instance, religious in the Catholic Church – see D. O’Murchu, Consecrated religious 
life: The changing paradigms, Orbis Books 2005. 
10
 For an introduction to  the development of simony, see T.A. McVeigh’s introduction to his 
translation of John Wyclif, On Simony, Fordham University Press 1992.   
11
 See further www.scientology.org.uk accessed 1/11/2011. 
12
 For instance Britons Against ‘Church’ of Scientology, 
http://www.againstscientology.co.uk/ (accessed 5/9/08).  
13
 See http://www.scientology.org/religion/catechism/pg028.html (accessed 5/9/08). 
14
 For a judicial view of this doctrine, see the US Supreme Court in Hernandez v 
Commissioner, 490 US 680 (1989).  
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It is oversimplistic, however, to assume that commercial religion is an activity only 
undertaken by members of a small number of religious communities in the UK – or to put it 
another way that commercial religion describes particular belief systems rather than 
particular activities. Approaches to commercial religion may well vary extensively within a 
single religious community.
15
 Even religions which do not emphasise commercial activity 
theologically will frequently charge for religious services, generating an operating profit in 
doing so.
16
 A good example is the marriage ceremony within the Anglican tradition of 
Christianity. The fees that may be charged for marriage are set by the Church,
17
 at a level so 
                                                          
15
 Consider, for instance, D. Ezzy “White witches and black magaic: Ethics and consumerism 
in contemporary witchcraft”, (2006) 21(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 15; D. Cush, 
“Consumer witchcraft: Are teenage witches a creation of commercial interests?” (2007) 28(1) 
Journal of Beliefs & Values 45; P.E. Klassen, “Radio Mind: Protestant experimentalists on 
the frontiers of healing”, (2007) Journal of American Academy of Religion, 75(3), 651; 
S.Hunt, “’Winning Ways’: Globalisation and the impact of the health and wealth gospel”, 
(2000) 15(3) Journal of Contemporary Religion 331 at 333; S. Hunt, “Magical Moments: An 
Intellectualist Approach to the Neo-Pentecostal Faith Ministries.” 
(1998) 28(3) Religion 271. 
16
 Consider D. Cush, “Consumer witchcraft: Are teenage witches a creation of commercial 
interests?” (2007) 28(1) Journal of Beliefs & Values 45 at 51. 
17
 As of January 2011, the charge for a marriage service was £262 – see Table of Parochial 
Fees Prepared by Archbishops Council 
(http://www.churchofengland.org/media/56804/Fees%20Table%202011%20both%20sides.p
df). These fees are prepared under the Ecclesiastical Fees Measure 1986, and authorised by 
the Parochial Fees Order 2010. 
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that the consumer of the marriage service pays an above break-even rate, making ‘a 
contribution to the provision of a church in your community’.18  
Cultural tensions around commercial religion do not, as the above illustrates, map directly 
onto tensions around very small minority religions. In a number of cases, of course, the 
activity will be outside the mainstream, falling within the range of spiritual practices 
increasingly categorised as occulture,
19
 and even outside the narrow definition of religion I 
have adopted for working purposes above.
20
 In others, however, the activity will be much 
more mainstream. A striking recent example is from Ireland, a majority Catholic country 
where Mass cards have for some time been available,
21
 and in 2009 were the subject of 
                                                          
18
 See http://www.yourchurchwedding.org/your-wedding/the-cost-of-church-weddings.aspx 
(accessed 14 July 2011). 
19
 C.H. Partridge, The re-enchantment of the West: Alternative spiritualities, sacralisation, 
popular culture and occulture, (Continuum International, 2005 and 2006). 
20
 This paper does not discuss commercial practices based on non-naturalist beliefs which fall 
outside the definition of religion under Article 9. Seriousness, cogency, and cohesion may all 
be absent from some practices based on non-naturalist belief. See for instance W. Spencer, 
“To absent friends: Classical spiritualist mediumship and New Age Channelling compared 
and contrasted”, (2001) Journal of Contemporary Religion 16(3), 343; W. Spencer, “Are the 
stars coming out? Secularisation and the future of astrology in the West”, in G. Davie et al 
(eds), Predicting religion: Christian, secular and alternative futures, (Ashgate, 2003). 
21
 See for instance W. Dalton, “Mass stipends, mass offerings, mass cards”, (1990) 41(9) The 
Furrow 500-508; W. Dalton, “Multi-intentional mass cards: The recent decree”, (1991) 42(6) 
The Furrow 366-372;  
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constitutional litigation in McNally.
 22
 The Charities Act 2009 has, amongst other measures 
intended to better regulate charitable organisations, criminalised the sale of Mass cards which 
are not the subject of an arrangement made with a bishop or the provincial of an order of 
priests of the Roman Catholic Church. As MacMenamin J noted ‘A Mass card conveys the 
message that a Mass will be celebrated by a Roman Catholic Priest for an intention stipulated 
by the purchaser or done’.23 
The tension between religious and commercial arises, pointedly for the purposes of this 
paper, when we consider the broad textures of laws dealing with religious activity, and those 
dealing with commercial activity. For instance, to anticipate the discussion that follows, there 
are serious differences between the conception of autonomy underlying freedom of religion 
law and theory, and that underlying say consumer law and theory. Freedom of religion law, 
for instance that under the European Convention on Human Rights or the First Amendment to 
the US Constitution, is predicated upon a conception of the human being as one whose 
choices on matters of profound importance as to the good life should be respected. The 
freedom to make poor religious choices is central to this,
24
 as is a deep scepticism about the 
ability of the state to determine the quality of religious choices.
25
 Coupled with this emphasis 
                                                          
22
 McNally & Anor v Ireland & Ors [2009] IEHC 573, Irish High Court. 
23
 McNally & Anor v Ireland & Ors,  at para 3. 
24
 The regulation of inappropriate proselytism under, for instance, the ECHR, does not run 
counter to this, as the mischief being addressed is not the belief of the proselyte, but rather 
the danger posed to their manifestation rights of their actual beliefs by inappropriate 
proselytism. 
25
 But cf E. Bever, “Witchcraft prosecutions and the decline of magic”, (2009) 40(2) Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 263 at 284. 
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on individual power to judge is an emphasis on organisational religious autonomy as being 
vital to religious freedom. In both cases, the state defers to the judgment of others.
26
 
Consumer law, on the other hand, has become much more concerned with the vulnerability of 
the human being,
27
  or at least ‘consumers who take reasonable care of themselves, rather 
than the ignorant, the careless or the over-hasty consumer’,28 and their need for some 
protection from poor choices. Additionally, claims by commercial organisations to autonomy 
against state regulation have met with decreasing success.
29
  Buyer beware has lost some of 
its power in a way which believer beware has not. 
This is of more than theoretical significance. Even if commercial transactions involving the 
provision of religious services were not normally dealt with by recourse to law,
30
 it is clear 
that they are potentially subject to regulation. In particular, a recent legislative development 
                                                          
26
 My use of ‘defer’ may fairly be criticised as carrying with it the right of the state to do 
otherwise, which numerous writers on law and religion would reject – for instance 
Dooyeweerd’s view of sphere sovereignty in H. Dooyeweerd (tr. J. Kraay), Roots of Western 
Culture: Pagan, secular and Christian options, 2003, The Edwin Mellen Press. 
27
 This distinction between the autonomous holder of fundamental rights, and the vulnerable 
human being, is obviously open to serious criticism. See for instance B.S. Turner, 
Vulnerability and Human Rights, Penn State Press, 2006. 
28
 Office of Fair Trading v Purely Creative Ltd [2011] EWHC 106 at para. 62 per Briggs J.. 
See generally O. Bray and M. Starmer, (2011) 22(4) Ent LR 118-122. 
29
 Contrast Adair v US, 208 US 161 (1908) US S.Ct, Hammer US Attorney for the Western 
District of North Carolina v Dagenhart et al, 247 US 251 (1917) US S.Ct.,  and US v Darby, 
312 US 100 (1940) US S.Ct. 
30
 An issue beyond this paper, and the methodology used here, to resolve. 
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in the UK was intended by the sponsor specifically to extend the scope of such regulation. In 
1951, following a campaign by the Spiritualist National Union,
31
  the Fraudulent Mediums 
Act 1951 replaced existing penal sanctions
32
 in relation to ‘[acting] as a spiritualistic medium 
or [exercising] any powers of telepathy, clairvoyance, or other similar powers’,33 similar 
powers covering all activities within the professed practice of the ability to see beyond what 
are the normal powers of the human being.
34
 The 1951 offence was committed only when the 
defendant acted for reward,
35
 excluded ‘anything done solely for the purposes of 
entertainment’,36 required an intention to deceive,37 and prosecutions required the consent of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions.
38
 The Act survived substantial changes in criminal law, 
including even a wide ranging Fraud Act.
39
 It did not, however, survive the Consumer 
                                                          
31
 See M. Gaskill, Hellish Nell: Last of Britain’s Witches, 2001 at 342-347. 
32
 Repealing the Witchcraft Act 1735, and amending the Vagrancy Act 1824 s.4 – Fraudulent 
Mediums Act 1951 s.2. 
33
 Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951 s.1(1)(a) 
34
 Martin [1981] Crim LR 109, CC; cf. Doheny v England [1955] Crim LR 255, Mag. 
35
 Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951 s.1(2). 
36
 Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951 s.1(5). 
37
 Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951 s.1(1)(a) 
38
 Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951 s.1(4) 
39
 See S. Ramage, “The UK Fraud Offence Bill – a critical analysis”, (2005) 152, 3-5. 
12 
 
Protection Regulations (CPR) which abolished the existing offence,
40
 aiming to regulate such 
activity under the new regime of consumer protection.
 41
  
The CPR, which implements an EU directive,
42
 has been described as ‘the biggest change to 
the UK consumer protection framework for almost 40 years’.43 Although obviously not a 
central issue in the CPR,
44
  before the regulations came into effect, it was confirmed that an 
important change would be the removal of any intent to deceive requirement in relation to 
suppliers of services currently covered by the Fraudulent Mediums Act.
45
 Service providers 
within occulture in particular saw the change as a serious threat to their activities; or 
sometimes as a threat to their religious freedom. It led directly to the foundation of the 
                                                          
40
 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008/1277 sch.2, Part I, cl.3. 
41
 For the importance of such activity generally, T. Glendinning and S. Bruce, “New ways of 
believing or belonging: Is religion giving way to spirituality?”, (2007) 57(3) British Journal 
of Sociology 399. 
42
 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Directive 2005/29/EC of May 11, 2005; see 
generally B. De Groote and K. De Vulder, “European framework for unfair commercial 
practices: analysis of Directive 2005/29”, (2007) Journal of Business Law 16-42.  
43
 Lord Tunnicliffe. HL Deb, 23 April 2008, c1565.. See more generally S. Singleton, “The 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and IT/internet viral and buzz 
marketing issues”, (2008) Communications Law 13(4), 117-119. 
44
 See S. Singleton, “The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and 
IT/internet viral and buzz marketing issues”, (2008) 13(4) Comms L 117-119. 
45
 www.pm.gov.uk/output/page13563 (accessed 28 April 2009), as discussed in D.V. Barrett, 
“Unintended consequences”, (2008) Fortean Times  237,58-60. 
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Spiritual Workers Association,
46
 which is seeking to become ‘the code sponsor (government 
recognised self regulating body) for the spiritual sector’.47 Why did the founders of the SWA, 
and indeed others who lobbied against this change, have cause to be concerned? 
A central concern in this discussion of commercial religion, as touched on above, is that of 
autonomy, and the authority of legal actors to restrict autonomy. In particular, as I will 
demonstrate below, the removal of the intent to deceive requirement means false claims are 
primarily assessed on their truth or otherwise, not the sincerity of the person making them. In 
the context of commercial religion, this could lead to statements of religious or non-scientific 
fact being treated as statements which can be resolved, as any other, by legal actors making 
findings of fact. We can find this approach in a number of nineteenth and twentieth century 
cases,
48
 and concern about the approach led directly to the Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951. 
The central difficulty with this approach is that it brings legal actors immediately into areas 
which, if the law seeks to be neutral between religious truth claims, are extremely difficult to 
resolve. A claim to assist in avoiding eternal damnation, for instance, may quickly result in 
courts, and indeed trading standards officers, needing to resolve the traditionally contentious 
                                                          
46
 A UK organisation following in the footsteps of a French predecessor established in 1975 
“aid, guide and counsel fortune-tellers against the complexities of the law, the persecution of 
state agents, the temptations of charlatanism, and a failure to prepare for the future” (Cited in 
translation by Harvey, above, at 156). 
47
 http://www.theswa.org.uk/Public/Law.aspx (accessed 11 July 2011). 
48
 See Lawrence (1876) 36 LTR 404; Davis v Curry [1918] 1 KB 109; Bloodworth (1919) 83 
Justice of the Peace 460; Stonehouse v Masson [1921] 2 KB 819; Irwin v Barker (1925) 69 
Solicitor’s Journal 589; Duncan [1944] 1 KB 773, CA. On Duncan, see further M. Gaskill, 
Hellish Nell: Last of Britain’s Witches, 2001, London: Fourth Estate, at 207-213. 
14 
 
question of whether there is life after death. This is the sort of subject categorised by Baron 
Cleasby as ‘a very improper [one] for argument and decision in a court of law’.49 The same 
point was made even more strongly by the US Supreme Court in Ballard, where Justice 
Douglas suggested that ‘The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after 
death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent 
to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would 
be left of religious freedom’.50 In other words, therefore, when the CPR empowers a Trading 
Standards Officer to determine whether ‘a gipsy fortune teller on Epsom Downs’51 is acting 
lawfully, it raises profound issues of the authority of the state over individuals’ religious 
beliefs. Additionally, the CPR may lead to a TSO becoming intimately involved in the 
relationship of the individual to those with religious authority in their community as they seek 
to determine if that individual has been the victim of an aggressive commercial practice. 
Having established a working definition of commercial religion, and demonstrated my 
principal concerns, in the next section I consider how a key source of overarching legal 
values in the UK – the ECHR – has dealt with the issue. This is of considerable practical 
importance because of the pervasive legal impact of the ECHR through the Human Rights 
Act.  
II. Separating the religious and the commercial: The approach under the ECHR.  
The exercise of human rights in a commercial context is clearly not restricted to religious 
rights alone. As the lively debate on human rights and trade illustrates, the extent to which 
                                                          
49
 Monck v Hilton (1877) 2 Exch. Div. 268, at 275. 
50
 US v Ballard, 322 US 78 (1944) US Supreme Court. at 87. 
51
 A phrase used by Theo Mathew, DPP in 1952, to indicate unimportant cases of this kind – 
see Gaskill, above, at 347. 
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fundamental rights carry with them the right to profit from them is a matter of some general 
concern.
52
 This has not, however, resulted in a Convention-wide approach to the issue.
53
 The 
issue falls to be resolved, instead, by a consideration of Article 9 itself. 
Article 9 is typically seen as providing an absolute right in relation to belief, and a qualified 
right in relation to actions. Article 9 provides: 
9(1). Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
9(2). Freedom to manifest one’s religions or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
Only one decision under the ECHR deals directly with the reach of Article 9 in relation to 
commercial activities.
54
 In X and Church of Scientology v Sweden,
55
 the Church of 
                                                          
52
 Contrast E.-U. Petersmann, “Taking human dignity, poverty and empowerment of 
indivduals more seriously”, (2002) 13(4) EJIL 845 with P. Alston, “Resisting the merger and 
acquisition of human rights by trade law”, (2002) 13(4) EJIL 815 at 828. 
53
 Contrast rights under Article 8 with those under Article 1 of the First Protocol. See further, 
Taavitsainen v Finland, app.25597/07, Chamber; Schluga v Austria, app.65665/01, Chamber; 
see also Douiyeb v The Netherlands, app.31464/96, Grand Chamber; Wloch v Poland, app. 
27785/95, Chamber; Huber v Switzerland, app.12794/87, Court; Pavletic v Slovakia, 
app39359/98, Chamber; Dudek v Poland, app.633/03, Chamber; Wojciechowski v Poland, 
app. 522/04, Chamber; Maciej v Poland, app. 10838/02, Chamber; T. Allen, “Liberalism, 
social democracy and the value of property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, (2010) ICLQ 1055. 
54
 A separate line of cases, notably Kustannus v Finland, (1996), DR 85, Commission, concern the implications 
of associations adopting corporate structures. See more broadly M Emberland, The Human Rights of 
Companies: Exploring the structure of ECHR protection, Oxford, OUP, 2006. 
16 
 
Scientology had placed an advertisement in a periodical circulated to its membership for the 
sale of e-meters, stating that ‘there exists no way to clear without an e-meter’, and also 
describing it as ‘an invaluable aid to measuring man’s mental state and changes in it’. The 
Consumer Ombudsman became involved, and secured an injunction against the latter part of 
the description. The Church of Scientology and a Pastor of the Church claimed a violation of 
Articles 9, 10, and 14. I will return to the discussion of Articles 10 and 14 later. In relation to 
Article 9, the Commission concluded that the activity fell outside the protection of the Article 
entirely. It found that Article 9’s restricted protection of manifestation of religion ‘does not 
confer protection on statements of purported religious belief which appear as selling 
‘arguments’ in advertisements of a purely commercial nature by a religious group … 
although it may concern religious objects central to a particular need, statements of religious 
content present, in the Commission’s view, more the manifestation of a desire to market 
goods for profit than the manifestation of a belief’.56  
This decision receives some support, albeit by analogy, from other threads within Article 9 
jurisprudence. Article 9 does not generallyguarantee a person the right to exercise their 
religion through employment. The right to exit is normally regarded as a sufficient safeguard 
of Article 9 rights.
57
 Religious freedom is preserved by allowing the individual to choose 
freely between their employment and their beliefs, rather than requiring that employment to 
be modified to eliminate the need for choice.
58
 Further support for this emphasis on exit from 
the commercial sphere can be drawn from the Commission case of Kustannus v Finland,
59
 
where an association of freethinkers had set up a limited liability company which was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
55
 X and Church of Scientology v Sweden, app. 7805/77, Commission. 
56
 Ibid, para. 4. 
57
 P. Van Dijk et al, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2006, Antwerp and 
Oxford, at 766. 
58
 Consider Ahmad v UK, (1982) 4 EHRR 126; Stedman v UK (1997) 23 EHRR CD168.  
59
 op.cit, Commission. 
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required to pay church tax. The Finnish courts upheld the requirement on the basis that the 
company was a commercial enterprise rather than a religious community. The Commission 
found that a limited liability company could exercise Article 9 rights, but found the 
application to be manifestly ill-founded: 
“this applicant was registered as a corporate body with limited liability. As such it is 
in principle required by domestic law to pay tax as any other corporate body, 
regardless of the underlying purpose of its activities … it has not been shown that the 
[religious] association would have been prevented from pursuing the company’s 
commercial activities in its own name”.60 
By analogy, then, religious rights may be protected for commercial religion not by 
guaranteeing a right to sell, but rather by ensuring a right to give away. As in US cases such 
as Bartha, a provision prohibiting a practice for remuneration, when applied to a religion 
which allows but does not require remuneration, still allows the religion to be practised.
61
 
An implication of this stark reading of Article 9 would be that commercial religion is to be 
treated as simply commercial, with the protection of Article 9 not extending to the activity, 
despite its religious nature. The question of whether a particular activity is to be categorised 
as religious or commercial becomes of considerable significance. There are undoubtedly 
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instances when a purely commercial activity will take place in a religious context – in 
McNally , for instance, the commercial sale of Mass cards by a plaintiff who did not mention 
his religious belief was categorised as a situation where ‘[t]he sole interest that may be placed 
at risk is a commercial activity, albeit with a religious dimension.’.62 We might also expect 
commercial religious activity where such activity was acknowledged by the provider as being 
contrary to their religion, as falling outside the scope of religion.
63
 However, we have already 
seen in relation to Church of Scientology, that it is possible for categorisation of an activity as 
either religious or commercial to be contentious. In Church of Scientology, for instance, we 
see reference in separate parts of the opinion to a ‘purely commercial’ nature, and to a 
transaction being ‘more the manifestation of a desire to market goods for profit than the 
manifestation of a belief’. These are not necessarily the same, with the first emphasising the 
nature of the transaction, and the second the motivation of the supplier. 
Discerning whether a particular service should be categorised as commercial, and not 
religious, is thus not straightforward.
64
 Once a legal actor has made this categorisation, 
however, this reading of Article 9 provides a simple answer to how much of commercial 
religion is to be treated – it should be regulated as commercial activity, with no special 
protection derived from Article 9.  While possessing the virtue of simplicity, this reading of 
Article 9 poses a number of serious problems. Firstly, it embeds into the structure of Article 9 
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an incompatibility between commerce and religion which, while well-established in many 
religious systems present in Europe, is not universal.
65
 Secondly, it privileges religious bodies 
which do not make use of commercial practices either as a matter of doctrine, or as a practical 
implication of their economic status and history. Religious organisations, and individuals, 
frequently require resources to carry out their religious activities. The economic position of 
some religions, perhaps lacking capital resources or a large membership base providing a 
subscription income stream, may mean that they rely upon commercial income more than 
others. The state has no Convention obligation to provide such religious communities with 
the resources to carry out their religious activities, but if intervenes to prevent them from 
securing such resources, that may constitute an inappropriate exercise of state power. This 
concern with the economic position of rights holders may seem speculative, but in Murphy v 
Ireland the Court accepted the argument that allowing religious bodies to purchase 
advertising ‘would lean in favour of unbalanced usage by religious groups with larger 
resources’.66 Thirdly, as I will demonstrate in the next section, choosing to treat commercial 
religion simply as commercial does not eliminate all the special challenges commercial 
religion poses for regulation. 
In this section I showed that the most obvious reading of Article 9 excludes commercial 
religion from Article 9 protection when it is categorised as commercial rather than religious. 
It is not supportive of treating all commercial religious activity as religious activity protected 
by Article 9, unless restriction can be justified under Article 9(2). Some commercial religious 
activity, and on a flat reading of Article 9, much commercial religious activity, will fall to be 
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dealt with by the national law concerning commercial activity. In the next section, I will 
explore in more detail the issues raised by commercial religion by considering its regulation 
in one area of UK law. 
III. Regulating commercial religion: UK consumer law.  
Regulation of commercial activity by law, and state actors empowered by law, forms an 
important part of the UK and European legal landscape. It is a tremendously pervasive part of 
that landscape, and a fuller discussion of commercial religion would encompass areas of law 
as diverse as employment law, in the broadest sense, as it applies to religious employers; 
restrictions on commercial activity carried out by charities; and taxation of religious 
organisations and religious activities. For the purposes of this article, however, to show the 
practical significance and importance of considering commercial religion as such, and the 
continuation of special challenges regardless of a categorisation as purely commercial, it is 
necessary to focus upon one area of law. 
Consumer law highlights problems of the finding of fact in a way which other areas of 
regulation of commercial religion do not. In Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy,
 67
 for instance, 
the operators of a hotel refused to offer a double-bed to a homosexual couple because of their 
religious beliefs. As the Court of Appeal noted, “the facts were not in issue”,68 rather the 
question was whether the religious values of the operators could prevail against general state 
policy in relation to discrimination on sexual orientation in the provision of goods and 
services. This can be contrasted with, for instance, provision of spirit mediumship where the 
provider may not only seek to implement a minority value system based on their religion, but 
may also put the facts in issue, arguing that they are in accord with their religion. 
                                                          
67
 On which, see for instance Bull  and Bull v Hall and Preddy, [2012] EWCA Civ 83, CA.  
68
 Ibid, para. 6. 
21 
 
Additionally, as noted earlier, consumer law is an area where specific legislation dealing with 
commercial religion has recently been replaced with general legislation, intended in part to 
make it easier to regulate the provision of commercial religious services. The clear policy 
underpinning the extension of consumer law to areas previously covered by the Fraudulent 
Mediums Act suggests that those responsible for enforcing consumer law, and ultimately the 
courts, will be called upon to evaluate religious services against the requirements of 
consumer law. The Spiritual Workers Association, for instance, reports a Trading Standard 
Officer’s advice that ‘[b]y using the words heal or healer you are suggesting you can cure, 
this is not an acceptable term under the [CPR] unless you can give proof of such claims’.69 
Thus, although the CPR was seen by Deft as ‘not concerned with religious belief and 
consequently [lacking] specific mention of religion or faith (or fraudulent mediums)’,70 legal 
actors will need to engage with some of the particular challenges that this poses in the legal 
context.
71
 It is, accordingly, a useful case study to show, in detail, some of the practical 
difficulties of regulating commercial religion.  
Discussion will be simplified if we take the central concern of consumer protection to be 
protecting consumers from the harm caused by ‘defective goods, substandard services and 
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poor information’.72 The criminal offences under the CPR are in the tradition of the 
regulatory offences which have been ‘at the core of the United Kingdom’s consumer 
protection regime for decades’.73 The most wide-ranging provision is Reg.3(3), which 
provides that a commercial practice is unfair if it contravenes the requirements of 
professional diligence and is likely to materially distort the economic  behaviour of the 
average consumer. When the practice is directed at a particular group, the average consumer 
‘shall be read as referring to the average member of that group’,74 particularly when that 
group is especially vulnerable, for instance on grounds of credulity.
75
   
Although the provision of broadest reach, this provision is of much less practical significance 
than the more specific provisions of the CPR, which prohibit a range of more specific 
misconducts, including misleading acts and omissions,
76
 and aggressive commercial 
practices, which are likely to be preferred over the general provision when they apply.
77
 The 
latter defines a commercial practice as aggressive if, “taking account of all features and 
circumstances … it significantly impairs or is likely significantly to impair the average 
consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct in relation to the product concerned through the use 
of harassment, coercion, or undue influence”.78 Undue influence is, in turn, defined as 
“exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer as to apply pressure, even without 
                                                          
72
 OFT Press Notice, 1999 quoted in G. Woodroofe and R. Lowe, Consumer Law and 
Practice, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010), para. 1.03. 
73
 P. Cartwright, “Unfair commercial practices and the future of the criminal law”, (2010) 7 
Journal of Business Law 618-637 at 618. 
74
 CPR Reg. 2(4). 
75
 CPR Reg. 2(5). 
76
 CPR Reg. 5,6. 
77
 P. Cartwright, above, at 622. 
78
 CPR Reg. 7(1), 11. 
23 
 
using or threatening physical force, in a way which significantly limits the consumer’s ability 
to make an informed decision”.79 
These are in turn supplemented by a list of specific prohibited practices under Schedule 1, the 
most relevant of which for our purposes are claiming that a trader or product has been 
approved or endorsed by a public or private body when it has not,
80
 promoting a product 
similar to a product made by a particular manufacturer in such a manner as to deliberately 
mislead the consumer into believing the product is made by that same manufacturer when it 
is not,
81
 claiming that the product is able to facilitate winning in games of chance,
82
 and 
falsely claiming that a product is able to cure illness, dysfunction or malformations,
83
 and 
falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to 
his ‘trade, business, craft or profession’.84  These prohibited practices do not require 
consideration of the likely effect on consumers.
85
A key feature to draw out from the offences 
which accompany these provisions is the mens rea of the trader. In relation to the specific 
offences of misleading acts and omissions, aggressive commercial practices, and the 
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specifically prohibited practices under Schedule 1, there is no explicit mens rea 
requirement,
86
 and the CPR Guidance indicates that these are ‘strict liability offences’.87   
How should an enforcement authority,
 88
 bound by the regulations with a duty to enforce 
them, go about applying these provisions to commercial religion? They have substantial 
powers to aid them in enforcing the CPR,
89
 but these powers do not help them with the 
fundamental problems posed by determining the satisfactoriness of religious goods and 
services, discussed in Section I above. 
An obvious approach to religious goods and services would be to focus on the sincerity of the 
seller. This was formerly the case for the specific offence under the Fraudulent Mediums Act, 
which as discussed above, required an intent to deceive, and a similar requirement has been 
read into similar statutes in some US cases,
90
 and into the Napoleonic Code in France.
91
 The 
CPR, as discussed above, has been intentionally crafted to remove the focus on sincerity in 
the Fraudulent Mediums Act. Even ignoring the legislative background, the discussion of 
mens rea above shows that deliberate fraud is frequently not required for a criminal offence 
under the CPR. For instance, falsely claiming that a product is able to cure illness, 
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dysfunction or malformations, is a strict liability offence,
92
 where any due diligence defence 
is based on circumstances other than the mens rea of the seller. 
Another obvious approach would be to treat a transaction concerning a religious good or 
service as one understood by both parties as being of a special nature. In relation to the 
offence of misleading actions or omissions, Peter Deft, the Assistant Director at BERR, saw 
an offence as unlikely to occur where ‘a person pays for spiritualistic services (or as another 
example, astrological services) knowing full well what they are buying … because the 
consumer would not have been misled into taking a transactional decision he would not 
otherwise have taken’.93 This has limited traction even for the misleading actions and 
aggressive commercial practices offences – is there not an offence if a portrayed shared 
understanding between customer and client that mediumship or astrology works is absent? It 
does not in any case apply to other important offences under the CPR, such as that 
concerning healing, which do not require any impact on transactional decision making.  
A third approach, hinted at by the comment on Deft above, would be to concentrate primarily 
on the relational elements of the transaction, rather than the product itself. Insofar as this can 
be brought out from the CPR, this would however serve to extend the reach of criminal 
sanctions under the CPR, rather than reduce them. The aggressive commercial practice 
provisions do not require hostility and, through the reference to undue influence,
94
  open the 
possibility of  religious power, for instance through a place in an ecclesiastical hierarchy or a 
status of special holiness or religious knowledge, forming the basis of an offence under the 
                                                          
92
 Under CPR Schedule 1, para. 17. 
93
 Person correspondence cited by Barrett, above. 
94
 It is unclear how far cases on the term in other areas of English law should be used to inform discussion of 
this provision (see P Cartwright, “Under pressure: Regulating aggressive commercial practices in the UK”, 
[2011] LMCLQ 123, at 129). As illustrative of the issue of religion and undue influence more generally 
however,, see Azaz v Denton [2009] EWHC 1759, QB; Hollis v Rolfe, [2008] EWHC 1747, Ch; Catt v Church of 
Scientology Religious Education College Inc [2001] C.P. Rep 41, QB. 
26 
 
CPR. The CPR does not categorise every transaction with an asymmetry of power as 
involving an aggressive commercial practice, recognising that sometimes “asymmetry is 
inevitable”.95 Thus not every relationship where the trader is in a position of  spiritual power 
over the consumer will be covered by this regulation. Its application, however, turns on a 
number of difficult judgments by the finder of fact – notably whether the conduct was 
sufficiently culpable as to amount to exploitation of the circumstances, whether it led to a 
significant potential impairment of the customer’s freedom of choice, and whether it was 
likely to cause a difference in the transactional decision of the customer.
96
 As Lord 
Donaldson has observed, “[p]ersuasion based upon religious belief can … be much more 
compelling and the fact that arguments based upon religious beliefs are being deployed 
by someone in a very close relationship … will give them added force”.97  Determining 
whether the undoubted influence of religion constitutes undue influence is extremely 
challenging.
98
 Normally, there is a further need to show that the circumstances would have 
impacted on the average consumer, rather than simply on the customer. In our case, however, 
the provision that the group is assessed against a particularly targeted group, especially where 
that group is more vulnerable due to a characteristic such as credulity, is likely to render this 
relatively straightforward. If by credulity we mean likelihood to believe a particular claim in 
particular circumstances, rather than some general character trait, it seems difficult to argue 
that co-religionists will not be more likely to believe the claims of their religion than the 
general public. Additionally, when evaluating whether a practice is aggressive, one factor to 
take account of is whether it exploits any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity 
as to impair the consumer’s judgment.99 So a religious service offered to members of a 
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religious community to alleviate particular misfortune may be unusually amenable to 
regulation under this provision. 
A straight reading of the CPR, then, suggests that trading standards officers are to interpret 
commercial religion simply as commerce, and that the structure of the CPR in a number of 
instances requires them to resolve truth claims, even religious truth claims, and potentially to 
evaluate the relationship between an individual and their religious community to ensure there 
are no aggressive practices. If a healing ministry similar to that of the United Reform Church, 
with ‘prayer with the laying on of hands [to] acknowledge the Lord’s healing touch in body, 
mind, and spirit for the whole person including the affected part’,100 were to be carried out 
commercially, the TSO would need to determine, but only need to determine, if claims as to 
its efficacy were true or false. If Lucky I-Ching coins were sold by a Feng Shui practitioner to 
improve success at the National Lottery on the basis that ‘they really work!’,101 if the 
TStandards Officer was satisfied that the National Lottery was a game of chance, the relevant 
offence would be committed even if the practitioner believed the claim to be true. In either 
example, if the good or service was purchased from an individual in a position of religious 
power, the TSO may find that that position was being exploited so that, regardless of the 
efficacy of the good or service,  an offence was committed. 
As discussed in the introduction, it is evident that resolving this sort of situation in the same 
way as any othercommercial transacton is problematic in terms of religious freedom. There 
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are, however, possible counter-currents within both the ECHR and the UK law which could 
serve to reduce the impact on religious freedom of treating commercial religion simply as 
commerce. 
IV: Reblending religion and commerce: Counter-currents. 
IV.1. Counter-currents under the ECHR. 
If the religious freedom guarantees of Article 9 were to apply in some form to commercial 
religious transactions, the Human Rights Act may result in UK courts needing to interpret 
consumer law terms, such as the prohibition on ‘unfair commercial practices’ in the CPR 
reg.3(1), so as to ensure activities protected under Article 9 are excluded from the reach of 
consumer protection. Is there an alternative reading of Article 9 which may have that effect? 
I noted earlier that a single decision of the Commission under Article 9 was the only authority 
directly bearing on commercial religion. There is, however, a more developed line of cases, 
including decisions by the Court, on commercial speech under the freedom of expression 
guarantees in Article 10. Article 9 and Article 10 are closely related both structurally, for 
instance in relation to justifying the restriction of rights embodied in the Article, and as 
embodying classic human rights rather than rights with ‘characteristics of the social and 
economic rights’.102 Additionally, in a number of cases involving Article 9 and Article 10 
claims, the Court has chosen to resolve them purely as commercial speech cases under 
Article 10, rather than discuss Article 9 arguments.
103
 Although this reflects a broader 
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willingness by the Court to avoid Article 9 discussion when other rights can be invoked, it 
does suggest that commercial activity under Article 9 and under Article 10 may be capable of 
resolution on the same terms.  
The commercial speech doctrine under Article 10 can be traced back to the First Amendment 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court, where restriction of commercial speech was 
subjected to a considerably lower level of scrutiny than restriction of political speech.
104
 The 
ECHR approach, obviously influential in the UK,
105
 similarly recognises that commercial 
speech can fall within Article 10, but subjects  State restriction of such speech to a lower 
level of scrutiny. The key case is Markt Intern and Beermann v Germany,
106
 where the Court 
found that speech of a commercial nature could fall within the protection of Article 10,
107
 but 
that the margin of appreciation was ‘essential in commercial matters and, in particular, in an 
area as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition’.108 The decision has been seen 
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as laying down for commercial speech ‘a particularly deferential version of the margin of 
appreciation’.109 
In relation to Article 10, a number of grounds have been advanced for this treatment of 
commercial speech. Firstly, a key feature of freedom of expression guarantees is their 
relationship to the democratic process, and so the protection of fundamental rights more 
generally. In commercial speech, State regulation poses less of a threat to the democratic 
process than when the State regulates political speech. Secondly, although varying in 
intensity from State to State, there is a ‘well-established practice of economic regulation 
which necessarily includes restriction of speech related to economic transactions’.110 Thirdly:  
commercial speech  is generally easier to verify than political speech. Whereas in the 
political sphere the right policy choices are inherently contested and are expected to 
emerge from the interplay of opposing ideas, the components and characteristics of a 
product are, in most cases, not controversial. For this reason, governmental 
regulations on disclosure requirements and on false and misleading advertisement 
meet with less suspicion than any similar government regulation in the political 
sphere.
111
  
Subject to a reservation on the point of verifiability, which is that some commercial religious 
claims are likely to fall nearer to a political truth claim than a classic commercial truth claim, 
these arguments appear to work well in the context of Article 9. Restriction of religious 
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activity entirely poses a much greater threat to religious freedom, and the texture of a 
democratic state, than restricting religious activity where the provider wishes to charge a fee 
for its provision. Similarly, restriction of commercial activity frequently can be justified, and 
in practice is restricted for a variety of state aims across Europe. 
If this line of cases, rather than Church of Scientology, was adopted in relation to Article 9 
the ECHR obligations upon the state in relation to commercial religion would become much 
more nuanced. Rather than commercial religion falling outside the scope of Article 9 entirely, 
it would fall within the protection of Article 9, but with restriction of the right under Article 
9(2) easier to justify, and Convention regulation of state decision making allowing a wider 
margin of appreciation. The concerns I raise earlier would need to be reflected in determining 
whether a restriction on a particular commercial religious activity – such as for instance faith 
healing – was justified under Article 9(2). Commercial religious interests would not be ruled 
out at the beginning of Article 9 consideration, but, recognising the complex issues 
concerning commercial activity in national life, may be easier to restrict than pure religious 
interests. Interestingly, the recent English case of Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy,
112
 
although giving considerable weight to the commercial context in finding that the proprietors 
of a hotel who discriminated on the grounds of sexual orientation were not protected by 
Article 9, proceeded on the basis that Article 9 was engaged,
113
 but that the restriction was 
justified in part because they remained able to manifest their beliefs outside the commercial 
sphere.
114
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A less radical re-reading of Article 9 would be to keep the distinction in Church of 
Scientology between activities which are categorised as religious, and so fall under Article 9, 
and commercial activities, but to generously characterise commercial religion as religion. 
While this may not bring Article 9 into play for all commercial religion, it may increase its 
application to particular cases with, as we shall see in the next section, potential impacts on 
UK law. That is to say, the greater the willingness to categorise commercial religion as 
religion rather than commerce, the greater the impact of the ECHR on the reading of UK law. 
IV.2. Counter-currents in UK consumer law. 
In Part III, I applied a flat reading to the CPR, which left commercial religion posing 
considerable challenges. In this section I will consider strategies for reading down the CPR 
which, if adapted by the courts, could reduce the scope of these challenges. 
One strategy would be to seek to sever elements which are justiciable by a legal system from 
those which are not, and only resolve those which are justiciable. In other words, legal actors 
would regard as unprovable – but equally undisprovable – some characteristics of a good or 
service, leaving the issue to be resolved by the burden of proof. A dividing line with which 
legal actors may be comfortable is that between scientific and non-scientific claims. In an 
important US decision on creation science, Judge Overton characterised science as being 
guided by natural law, explanatory by reference to natural law, testable against the empirical 
world, forming tentative conclusions, and, following Popper, falsifiable rather than 
provable.
115
 Severing along this line would not impact on all religions equally, given the 
centrality of non-scientific yet world-impacting doctrines and practices to what Albanese has 
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dubbed ‘metaphysical religion’.116 It would, however, allow legal actors to focus on those 
issues which are most easily resolved within the legal system. So, for instance, in relation to a 
Church of Scientology claim that cancer could be cured by Scientology religious practices, 
Goff J found that ‘I cannot take judicial notice that it is false … although I think it might well 
have been proven wrong there is no evidence before me on which I can so find as a fact’.117 
Had evidence of recovery rates of cancer sufferers receiving Church sanctioned treatment 
been available and put to the court, this issue would have been nearer to resolution as a matter 
of fact, albeit one with some complicated issues of causation.
118
  
The complexity of religious goods and services means that this would not simply result in 
consumer law being disapplied to commercial religion. Rather, some elements of a 
commercial religion transaction would remain resolvable, and therefore suitable objects for 
consumer law protection. Two examples will elucidate this. 
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Firstly, to celebrate the 2000
th
 anniversary of the birth of St Paul the Apostle, the Catholic 
Church offered plenary indulgences to members of the Church who met certain conditions.
119
  
A plenary indulgence remits the entire temporal punishment due to sin, so that no further 
expiation is required in purgatory.  Although the process takes place in the physical world, 
the world in which the state is comfortable exercising jurisdiction, the claimed results 
exclusively fall outside of that world. It would be a bold, and intolerant, state which chose to 
identify such a service as unsatisfactory because no service could provide the metaphysical 
benefit. Nonetheless, if this sort of indulgence was to be the subject of a commercial 
transaction, there may be elements which could be dealt with by consumer law. Let us say a 
priest offering an indulgence for sale was not a member of the Roman Catholic Church based 
in the Vatican, but rather the competitor based in the USA. If they claimed that the USA 
based organisation was the authentic or true Catholic Church, distinct from the inauthentic 
organisation based in the Vatican, this would not seem to create a significant consumer law 
issue.
120
 But if the minister claimed, falsely, that their authority was derived from the Vatican 
organisation, this would seem to fall fairly comfortably into Schedule 1 of the CPR, as falsely 
claiming endorsement by a particular organisation.
121
  
Secondly, consider the case of Suzanne Hadwin. A variety of press reports suggest that she 
was called in by the resident of a council house who was experiencing  ‘a series of strange 
happenings, including doors slamming shut , the ghost of a little girl appearing on the landing 
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and, bizarrely, even her own dressing gown floating down the stairs’.122 She then removed 
the poltergeist by laying salt circles in the house, and then used the power of prayer, sprinkled 
holy water, and angelic assistance to “‘take the spirit to the place he needed to be taken’”.123 
The local District Council paid half of her fee for doing so. The benefits conferred were not 
purely metaphysical, as the occupants of the house anticipated, and reported, a considerable 
improvement in the quality of their environment. Neither were they purely physical, as the 
removal of a spirit is not a physical phenomenon. To an outside observer, the mechanism for 
the creation of any benefits might be purely physical – the service making a difference to the 
social or psychological setting of the recipients. To the sincere participants, however, the 
exorcism works not because of the psychological mechanisms in play, but because of the 
power of the exorcist, or the grace of a metaphysical being. These may not be apt to be 
resolved legally. Other parts of the transaction, for instance claims as to the previous 
experience of Suzanna Hadwin in dealing with this sort of domestic disturbance, might on the 
other hand be apt to legal resolution. In resolving issues around this sort of service, however, 
one disturbing possibility is that a Trading Standards Officer may choose to categorise those 
who believe in hauntings and exorcism as per se  ‘without education, of weak and credulous 
spirit’,124 and apply the average consumer test under regulation 2(5)(a) accordingly, 
particularly when considering whether they have been subjected to an aggressive commercial 
practice. 
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This severing of naturalist and non-naturalist elements would not always limit the enquiry of 
a legal actor to easy issues of fact. A claim that a provider of religious services had been a 
disciple of a particular spiritual leader during their conventional lifetime could be resolved 
comparatively easily. The legal actor may be more challenged by a claim that a service 
provider is a genuine gypsy, or the seventh son of a seventh son, but ethnicity and lineage are 
issues the courts are prepared to deal with in other contexts. But what about a claim that a 
service provider has spiritual authority because of unbroken apostolic succession from Saint 
Peter? This is likely to involve a very extensive consideration of ecclesiastical history, and a 
resolution of historical issues that may tax a court in a different way.
125
 It may, nonetheless, 
allow some of the more problematic issues of commercial religion to be excluded from the 
consideration of the legal actors. 
The structure of the CPR is not, however, particularly supportive of severing along these 
lines. In general terms, one might argue for an interpretation of reg.2(6), intended to prevent 
mere puffs becoming actionable, so as to incorporate this distinction. Reg.2(6) protects the 
position of ‘exaggerated statements which are not meant to be taken literally’.126 If we were 
to interpret literal as meaning justiciable then, although religious providers may be unhappy 
at their claims being categorised as ‘exaggerated’, this would seem to be a mechanism for 
severing the two sorts of claims. As already shown in section II, however, religious rights 
under the Human Rights Act are unlikely to be engaged in relation to commercial religion; 
and an interpretation of ‘literal’ which gives effect to this distinction seems so far a departure 
for the clear meaning of the word as to be impossible short of the interpretative power of the 
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HRA. Thus, this severing may depend upon a change in the interpretation of Article 9 as 
argued for in IV.1 above. 
A second strategy allowing some severing of claims within the jurisdiction of the state from 
other claims may be to interpret ‘materially distort the economic behaviour’ of the consumer 
in a very specific way. The CPR defines this as impairing the ability ‘to make an informed 
decision thereby causing him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
otherwise’.127 Consider the sort of claim which does not seem apt to resolution by Trading 
Standards Officer or court – for instance a claim to communication with a person after their 
death. When faced with a consumer paying a medium for such communication, it is difficult 
to argue that a consumer who knew this claim to be untrue would not have acted differently 
from one who wrongly believed it to be true. There is more ground, however, for arguing that 
a person who knew the state had found it to be untrue might act exactly the same as if they 
did not know this. The difficulty with this mode of severing, however, is that proof of an 
impact on the transaction decision, while necessary under the general prohibition under 
Regulation 3(3) and, in a slightly different form, in the more specific prohibitions under 
Regulations 5-7, is not required for the prohibitions under Schedule 1.  
A third strategy would be to emphasise the provision of services, not results. This was seen as 
an important distinction by Steven Upton, of the Spiritualist’s National Union, when he 
suggested that ‘If you are claiming you can prove life after death you’ve got a problem. We 
never guarantee it is going to work. Trained mediums don’t make false claims’.128 To return 
to the example of Suzanne Hadwin, it may be that we cannot demand of exorcism services 
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proof that the exorcism has succeeded, but we can demand that it has been carried out 
properly. If a particular ritual was laid down by a particular tradition for exorcism, and the 
practitioner failed to perform it in that way, the state may inquire into whether the service met 
the standards of professional diligence, assessed against the average member of the tradition. 
A particular problem arises in our context, however, as determining the average member of 
the tradition may be particularly difficult. Exorcism is a more contested, and splintered, area 
of human practice than, say, plumbing. How do we determine the tradition against which 
Suzanne Hadwin is to be measured – is it exorcists generally (even if their theoretical 
underpinnings and practices are incompatible), spiritualist mediums, or spiritualist mediums 
who are assisted by a Native American spirit guide, and draw upon Native American 
practices such as smudging, that is, the burning of particular herbs as part of a purification 
ritual?
129
 Analogous with the second generation of kosher fraud laws in the US,
130
 it may be 
that this can be resolved primarily by fair labelling, with the label that the service provider 
uses when providing their service being that against which they are judged – so for instance, 
if Suzanne Hadwin identified herself as a spirituralist medium employing smudging, her 
competence as a smudging practitioner is the measure. It leaves open the possibility, 
however, of service providers identifying as a one-person tradition, so that their own practice 
is the only sensible measure of the professional diligence of an average member of their 
tradition. Additionally, it may involve legal actors in determining the content of competent 
practice in marginal practices. We can see this in the French case of Bernard Leborgne in 
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1967. Here the court engaged in an extended discussion of astrology, concluding that ‘to 
achieve its practical goal, the horoscope, which is founded on the exact state of the celestial 
vault at the time and place and birth, requires the utilization of complex rules and calculations 
as well as mathematical and astronomical knowledge’. 131 The verdict concluded that, as there 
was no evidence to contradict his claim that he has conscientiously followed those rules, 
there was no basis for an accusation of fraud. UK courts may be somewhat reluctant to set 
down standards of competence for, for instance, faith healers and exorcists from a range of 
traditions. 
A fourth strategy could be based upon the definition of ‘trader’ under the CPR. The offences 
outlined above apply to traders, defined under the Regulations as ‘any person who in relation 
to a commercial practice is acting for purposes relating to his business’.132 A straightforward 
reading of this clause may be useful to providers of commercial religious services on an ad 
hoc, low volume basis, who may be able to argue that they are not traders.
133
 The distinction 
between a trader and a non-trader is likely to turn on factors such as profit-seeking motive, 
the number and frequency of transactions, and the time between the purchase and sale of 
products.
134
 A more radical interpretation of this clause would be to exclude commercial 
religion from the category of ‘his business’, even if it was a regular, large scale, concern. 
Given the legislative history to the CPR, however, and the policy justifications for 
appropriate regulation of commercial activity, even when religious, this interpretation again 
appears unlikely. Even an interpretation of the ECHR which treated commercial religion as 
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simply religion – inconsistent with the current jurisprudence – would not justify moving the 
entire activity completely out of the reach of the CPR. 
While some of the strategies outlined above would have some impact on reducing the impact 
of the CPR on some commercial religious practices, the structure of the CPR is not 
supportive of judicial strategies to give weight to the religious element of commercial 
religion across its reach. Another possibility is amendment of the CPR. As mentioned earlier, 
the CPR gives effect to EU law on consumer protection so, even if there was UK political 
will to effect change, it may be constrained by the EU framework.  
A provision specifically dealing with commercial religion may be able to deal with the issues 
with greater sensitivity to the complexity of the challenges than the current regime, both in 
relation to resolving truth claims, and evaluating commercial practices for aggressiveness. 
There is, however, always the danger that a legislator addressing these issues may see an 
opportunity for restricting some forms of commercial religious activity, for instance magical 
practices, as inherently against the interests of consumers.
135
 Another possibility is for the 
legislator to seek to protect particular practices, or to enter into a regulatory partnership with 
particular trusted religious organisations. We can see both of these in play in the Mass card 
case of McNally, introduced above. In McNally the legislation stated that ‘A person who sells 
a Mass card other than pursuant to an arrangement with a recognised person shall be guilty of 
an offence’.136 The Court noted that this legislation, by associating recognised persons with 
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officials of the Roman Catholic Church, created ‘a simple evidential proof’.137 The proof 
went to ‘the authenticity issue of Mass cards’,138 to dealing with the mischief caused by 
‘bogus Mass cards’.139 So the Irish legislation constructs unsatisfactory Mass cards as ones 
which are inauthentic according to the Roman Catholic Church, and Catholic Canon Law. 
The principle of state neutrality between religions, however, is difficult to square with 
prioritising goods and services offered by one religious organisation over competitors. 
Although the court in the Mass card case did not see the use of officials within ‘the’ Roman 
Catholic hierarchy as problematic, it would be interesting to have seen their approach had the 
supplier received suitable endorsement from the Roman Catholic church led by Pope Pius 
XIII from Springdale, USA; rather than Pope Benedict XVI from the Vatican.
140
 Would the 
court have allowed legislation which criminalised mass cards issued by the former Catholic 
Church, because they lacked the authority of the latter? 
More fruitful than either of these legislative approaches may be the crafting of an exemption, 
that is a defence, for some truth claims for trade offered explicitly within a religious 
framework which is sincerely believed by the trader. This could be crafted narrowly, for 
instance to protect only activities which constituted administering the beliefs, practices, or 
usages of an individual within a religious organisation;
141
 or draw upon the existing 
discrimination law doctrines of religious ethos to provide some protection. Alternatively, 
such a defence could adopt the arguments in this article to combine an emphasis on sincerity 
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– present in the Fraudulent Mediums Act and deliberately removed in the CPR – with the 
severing along naturalist lines suggested above. New legislation which ‘recognises genuine 
mediumship and protects spiritual workers from discrimination and abuse’142 is the subject of 
campaigning by the Spiritual Workers Association. 
Perhaps more likely an alternative would be for the Office of Fair Trading, together with the 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform to expand its current guidance on 
the CPR to deal with the issues of evaluation of factual claims and relationships within a 
religious community. While of necessity having to operate within the strictures of the CPR, 
this soft law might at least reduce the chance of uneven enforcement by enforcement officers 
seeking to apply the law from first principles to this challenging area. The current lack of 
clear guidance on commercial religion opens up the possibility of uneven enforcement, 
particularly as the duty to enforce the CPR ‘does not mean that (civil or criminal) 
enforcement action must be taken in respect of each and every infringement’,143 and the 
growing tendency in consumer law is to resolve cases by informal action by regulators.
144
 
Barrett in particular fears uneven enforcement itself having a religious element,
145
 a fear 
echoed by the Spiritual Workers Association, which warns members that ‘in the event of a 
complaint … the outcome may well depend on the views of the person investigating the 
complaint’.146 If, however, this danger were to materialise in a particular case, then religious 
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freedom law, excluded by the most likely reading of the reach of ECHR Article 9, may return 
through the concept of religious discrimination tied to a reading of Article 9 and Article 14 
together. In the Church of Scientology case, an Article 9/14 claim failed, but the 
Commission’s list of factors which were absent in the case may suggest circumstances under 
which it could succeed:  
The case file does not, consequently, disclose that the authorities singled out the 
applicants for special attention. Nor is there any indication that the authorities have 
deliberately refrained from intervening against comparable advertisements by other 
religious communities.
147
 
IV.3 Resistance and accommodation by commercial providers of religious goods and 
services. 
Earlier I mentioned the opposition triggered by the proposals to repeal the Fraudulent 
Mediums Act. As well as political resistance to the legislation, noted at the end of the 
previous section, it is important to recognise that the recipients of regulation are not passive 
objects of law. Rather, we would expect to see them seek to engage with the new legal order 
so as to minimise the damage it causes to their interests. In this section, I consider a range of 
strategies which individual commercial providers of religious goods and services may 
consider. A valuable resource here, in the absence of a socio-legal study, is the advice offered 
to its members by the Spiritual Workers Association.  
Firstly, some providers may seek to avoid the CPR in relation to price. The SWA is sceptical 
about the extent that consumer law can be avoided no matter how ‘money or gifts change 
hands’, warning members that the CPR applies even to donations, fees raised for charity, and 
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entrance fees which include ‘free healing’. The scepticism of the SWA is warranted.148 In 
particular, providers of religious services which are usually conditional upon a payment are 
unlikely to be able to avoid the reach of consumer law simply because the payment is termed 
a ‘donation’, for instance in relation to masses said at the Roman Catholic National Shrine at 
Walsingham.
149
 
Secondly, providers may seek to use disclaimers as a protection against legal action. As the 
SWA notes ‘the use of disclaimers has not yet been proven to be a legally effective defence’, 
although it does include a selection of disclaimers for use by members. Two US cases suggest 
that detailed, oral, disclaimers which point out the limits of the service being provided may 
be more efficacious than more general disclaimers. In People ex rel Priess v Adams,
150
 an 
astrologer charged with a specific offence of pretending to foretell events testified that she 
always explained to clients that no astrologer could conscientiously say that any particular 
thing would happen, that she had advised the detective-client who gave evidence against her 
that failing to give the exact hour of birth would impair the reading,  and that she had merely 
attempted to explain the positions of the planets and to read their indications. The court 
accepted this argument. In State v Neitzel,
151
 on the other hand, an astrologer’s conviction 
under a vagrancy statute was upheld. His declaration that he could not tell fortunes was 
considerably diluted by his offering to ‘figure it out’ for a fee. Additionally, again drawing on 
US jurisprudence, specific oral disclaimers may work better than standard written terms, or a 
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notice displayed at the venue where the service is provided.
152
 Another possibility for a 
disclaimer may be to emphasise the distinction between truth, and truth as found by the State 
– for instance, stating that the efficacy of the services has been denied by a local trading 
standards officer, or even (looking to the future) a decision of the courts. 
Thirdly, providers may seek to rely upon the genuineness of the claims made. The SWA 
advises against this, noting that ‘we live in a litigious society and there are people who earn 
their living from suing others. The concern with the new legislation is that mediums, however 
genuine, will be perceived as an easy target’. The problems with evaluating some commercial 
religion claims have been noted above. 
Fourthly, ‘it has been suggested that we should say that we are working for entertainment or 
that what we do is a scientific experiment’. This has been rejected by the SWA as untrue, and 
indeed ‘a denial of our beliefs’. Instead, and strikingly put in terms of autonomy, ‘We believe 
that we should simply explain that those attending demonstrations or sittings have made a 
personal choice to do so. They are responsible for any decisions they choose to make as a 
result of the reading or demonstration’. Although closely in line with the view of autonomy to 
be found in freedom of religion law, it does not, however, match so closely the orientation of 
consumer protection law, including the CPR. 
There is, of course, a final route open to providers of commercial religious goods and 
services. They may opt out of consumer law by ceasing to offer the religious service for 
remuneration, and instead making it available free of charge. Taking this approach means that 
commercial religion ceases to be commercial, and becomes purely a religious practice. The 
complexities of commercial religion are resolved by its extinction. 
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Concluding thoughts.  
The challenges of commercial religion can be met by simple answers, or by good ones, but 
sadly not by good, simple, answers. The simple answer to the blending of the commercial and 
religious, and the clashing views of autonomy and appropriate regulation by the state, is to 
police the separation of the two. Article 9 of the ECHR treats commercial religion as 
commerce, as does a flat reading of the CPR. The radical reading of ‘trader’ in the CPR 
discussed above would treat commercial religion as purely religious, and then privilege it 
beyond the qualified right in Article 9. Neither provides a good answer to the question of how 
to regulate commercial activity which is also religious activity. The good answers seek to 
balance the demands of appropriate regulation of commercial activities, and in this study the 
goals of consumer law, with the demands of both religious liberty, and, so far as it can be 
regarded as a separate demand, that of religious neutrality. They are, however, complex, and 
difficult to square with the current legal rules. These rules were not drafted to accommodate 
commercial religion, and implementing these answers may depend upon legislative action. 
The likelihood of such action is beyond this paper. As a recent newspaper columnist has 
noted ‘in most of the Western world fortune telling has lost its potency – that is, unless the 
fortune-teller happens to be a scientist, pollster, or economist’.153 
Beyond the doctrinal and practical problems of how the ECHR and UK consumer law 
engages with commercial religion, however, this discussion opens up some broader issues. 
The discussion suggested three areas of possible difficulty in the regulation of commercial 
religion. Firstly, the clash of values, where a commercial body seeks to give effect to 
religious values which are not compatible with state policy in the area regulated. This has 
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obvious application to areas such as discrimination law. An interpretation of Article 9 which 
places commercial religion primarily into commerce simpliciter provides very limited space 
for the manifestation of religion through commercial activity to be accommodated by 
variation of the generally applicable rules. An interpretation which moved the focus to Article 
9(2), and the justification for restriction of the manifestation of religion, would give more 
room for those holding such values to seek to argue – but obviously not to simply assert - that 
their religious rights needed to be taken into account, even contrary to general state policy, 
and even in the commercial field. Secondly, the determination of facts, where the religious 
person’s understanding of reality differs from that of the finder of the fact. This has been a 
particular focus of the case-study of consumer law, but could also apply to areas such as the 
law of obligations. The detailed discussion above has shown the importance, but also the 
difficulty, of being aware of the issues of Church/State relations raised by seemingly trivial, 
or even frivolous, factual claims. Finally, the framing of the relationship between an 
individual and their broader religious community, particularly those in positions of power 
within that religious community. This has been discussed in relation to undue influence as an 
aggressive commercial practice, but the concept of undue influence has much broader 
application, perhaps most significantly in relation to the passing of property and the 
formation of contractual obligations. This discussion has introduced the difficulty of 
determining whether a religious context renders an action exploitative, or when the influence 
of religion becomes undue influence, in a way which gives sufficient weight to religious 
liberty.   
Finally, it is too early to say how the regulation of commercial religion will develop in UK 
law. This area may, however, come to provide valuable insights into how religion and law 
interact more broadly.  
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Firstly, the focus of this paper has been on hybrid activities on the cusp of the commercial 
and religious. Hybrid religious activities are not restricted to this area, however, and it is easy 
to imagine scenarios at the cusp of the sexual and the religious, the familial and the religious, 
or the political and the religious. The way in which UK law constructs commercial religion, 
particularly if that construction is to categorise hybrid activities as really commercial, may be 
influential in the categorisation of these other hybrid activities. 
Secondly, if commercial religious transactions of the sort outlined above are simply treated as 
any other commercial transaction, regardless of the special difficulties that they pose in terms 
of evaluation, it may provide an important marker of the extent to which those with non-
naturalist beliefs can expect to find actions based on those beliefs regulated by the legal 
system. It may be that we will see an arc from a willingness of the State to enforce a view on 
such matters based on a state-approved worldview based on Christianity, through a 
comparatively brief period where the State lacks the confidence to do this due to ‘the long 
decline of institutional Christianity and its ability to stigmatise … as deviant or dangerous’,154 
to a renewed enthusiasm for resolving religious truth claims through the law. 
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